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Abstract. At present, network users have to manage one set of authen-
tication credentials (usually a username/password pair) for every service
with which they are registered. Single Sign-On (SSO) has been proposed
as a solution to the usability, security and management implications of
this situation. Under SSO, users authenticate themselves only once and
are logged into the services they subsequently use without further manual
interaction. Several architectures for SSO have been developed, each with
different properties and underlying infrastructures. This paper presents
a taxonomy of these approaches and puts some of the SSO schemes, ser-
vices and products into that context. This enables decisions about the
design and selection of future approaches to SSO to be made within a
more structured context; it also reveals some important differences in
the security properties that can be provided by various approaches.
1 Introduction
Network users typically maintain a set of authentication credentials (usually a
username/password pair) with every Service Provider1 (SP) they are registered
with. The number of such SPs with which a typical user routinely interacts
has grown beyond the point at which most users can memorize the required
credentials. The most common solution is for users to use the same password
with every SP with which they register2 — a tradeoff between security and
usability in favour of the latter.
A potential solution for this security issue is Single Sign-On (SSO), a tech-
nique whereby the user authenticates him/herself only once and is automatically
logged into SPs as necessary, without necessarily requiring further manual in-
teraction. SSO thereby increases the usability of the network as a whole and at
the same time centralises the management of relevant system parameters.
?? The author is sponsored by the State Scholarship Foundation of Greece.
1 In the context of this paper a service provider is any entity that provides some kind
of service or content to a user. Examples of SPs include web services, messenger
services, FTP/web sites, and streaming media providers.
2 There are even tools that ‘synchronize’ passwords, such as those at www.psynch.com
and www.proginet.com/products/securpass/spsync.asp.
2Several different SSO architectures have emerged, each with different prop-
erties and underlying infrastructures. In this paper we identify four generic ar-
chitectures for SSO systems and discuss their strengths and weaknesses. The
remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the taxonomy,
and section 3 discusses the main properties of the architectures. Section 4 then
presents a variety of SSO schemes in the context of the taxonomy, and section 5
concludes the paper.
2 A taxonomy of SSO systems
As mentioned above, SSO systems support automatic user authentication to
SPs. As authentication implies identification, SSO systems have to incorporate
the life cycle management of the identifiers by which a user is known to the SPs
he/she is registered with. These identifiers can take various forms. We refer to
them collectively as ‘SSO identities’.
We distinguish between two main types of SSO systems. The first type, which
we call ‘pseudo-SSO’, involves use of a component which achieves SSO simply
by automatically executing whatever authentication mechanisms are in place at
the different SPs. At the beginning of a session the user has to authenticate
him/herself to this pseudo-SSO component: we call this step primary authenti-
cation. One key distinguishing feature of this SSO type is that, during an ‘SSO
session’, a separate authentication occurs every time the user is logged into an
SP. The pseudo-SSO component manages the SP-specific authentication creden-
tials, which constitute the SSO identities in this case. Since these SSO identities
are thus SP-specific, the SSO Identity/SP relationship can be said to be n : 1;
that is, any given SSO identity corresponds to exactly one SP, and a user may, in
principle, have multiple SSO identities for a single SP. This type of SSO scheme
is illustrated in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. Pseudo-SSO
3Pseudo-SSO is fundamentally different from the second type of SSO system,
which we call ‘true SSO’. In a true SSO scheme the user authenticates to an
entity called the Authentication Service Provider (ASP). The ASP is required
to have an established relationship with all SPs to which SSO is to be achieved.
This relationship requires a level of trust, and might typically be supported by
a contractual arrangement. There would also typically need to be a supporting
infrastructure to enable secure communications between ASPs and SPs. The key
distinguishing feature of true SSO is that the only authentication process that
involves the user occurs between the user and the ASP — SPs are notified of the
authentication status of the user via so-called authentication assertions. These
are statements that contain the user’s SSO identity and his/her authentication
status at the ASP. Note that the transport of these authentication assertions
will itself need to be secured by a means specific to the SSO scheme in use. The
exact form of SSO identities depends on the system design, but would typically
be uniform throughout the whole system.
In contrast to pseudo-SSO, under true SSO the SSO identity/SP relationship
can be n : m. That is, if supported by the scheme, not only can the user can
potentially choose from a ‘pool of identities’ for any given SP, but the same SSO
identity could, if the user wishes, be used with multiple SPs. This enables the as-
signment of specific roles to SSO identities (which then act as ‘role pseudonyms’
as defined in [19]). A true SSO scheme is depicted in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. True SSO
More generally, the information flows in an SSO system are shown in Fig-
ure 3. The user first authenticates to the ASP or pseudo-SSO component in
step 1. Whenever a service is requested (step 2), the ASP or pseudo-SSO com-
ponent automatically logs the user into the SP in step 3. Under true SSO this
identity establishment phase involves the ASP (securely) conveying assertions
about the user’s authentication status to the SP, whilst in a pseudo-SSO scheme
this step simply involves the pseudo-SSO component automatically performing
the SP-specific (legacy) authentication mechanism on the user’s behalf. Finally,
assuming that step 3 is successfully completed, service provision proceeds in
step 4.
4Fig. 3. Information flows in a generic SSO system
SSO architectures can be further categorised based on the location of the
ASP/pseudo-SSO component; specifically, this component can either be local to
the user platform, or offered as a service by an external entity, which we refer to
as the ‘SSO proxy’. We thus arrive at the following four main categories of SSO
systems:
– Local pseudo-SSO systems,
– Proxy-based pseudo-SSO systems,
– Local true SSO systems, and
– Proxy-based true SSO systems.
We next consider each of these four types of scheme in a little more detail.
2.1 Local pseudo-SSO systems
In a local pseudo-SSO system, the pseudo-SSO component is resident within
the user machine. This component maintains a (typically encrypted) database
of the various authentication credentials for the different SPs. The user authen-
ticates him/herself to the pseudo-SSO component at the beginning of a session.
From that point on the component automatically executes SP-specific authen-
tication protocols whenever needed, by supplying the (if necessary decrypted)
authentication credentials. A key property of this SSO architecture is that the
user machine needs access to cleartext versions of the long-term authentication
credentials, and the user must therefore trust the machine not to compromise
these credentials.
2.2 Proxy-based pseudo-SSO systems
In a proxy-based pseudo-SSO architecture, the pseudo-SSO component resides
on an external proxy server; as in the local case, this external server has ac-
cess to the user’s credentials, and hence must be trusted for this purpose by
the user. Primary authentication occurs between the user and the proxy at the
beginning of a session (and possibly thereafter if the proxy wishes to perform
5a re-authentication). Subsequent user authentication at SPs is redirected to, or
intercepted by, the proxy, which automatically executes the SP-specific authen-
tication protocol including supplying the requested credentials. A key property
of this architecture is that the local machine never has access to the user’s SP-
specific credentials; authentication to SPs occurs directly between the proxy and
the SPs.
2.3 Local true SSO systems
As explained above, under true SSO the ASP authenticates the user, and sub-
sequently conveys authentication assertions to relying SPs whenever necessary.
When a trusted component within the user system takes the role of the ASP, the
resulting architecture falls into the category of local true SSO systems. Of course
a trust relationship between the local ASP, the relying SPs, and a supporting
security infrastructure must exist. Since, in this setting, the ASP is under the
physical control of the user, mechanisms must be in place that guarantee the
integrity and trustworthiness of the ASP component itself.
2.4 Proxy-based true SSO systems
In a proxy-based true SSO architecture, an external server takes the role of the
ASP. This external server acts as a broker between users and SPs; registered
users can benefit from SSO at SPs that maintain a trust relationship with the
ASP. It is worth noting that the ASP can trivially impersonate any registered
user at every relying SP, simply by conveying an assertion. Therefore, both users
and SPs have to trust the ASP for the purposes of SSO. Note also that this
observation holds for the ASP in all (local or proxy-based) true SSO systems,
as well as for the pseudo-SSO component in all pseudo-SSO systems.
3 Properties of SSO schemes
This section presents some properties that distinguish the various types of SSO
system. The four SSO categories are examined with respect to these properties.
Examples of SSO implementations are also mentioned wherever appropriate.
3.1 Privacy protection
Privacy protection is of particular importance in open environments [23]. With
respect to SSO systems, privacy concerns arise if SSO identities contain person-
ally identifying information, or if it is possible for an attacker (which could be one
or more colluding SPs) to correlate distinct identities of the same user without
his/her consent. Thus SSO identity pseudonymity, in the sense that they do not
include any personally identifying information, and unlinkability are potentially
desirable properties, where the latter implies the former [19].
6Pseudo-SSO systems cannot guarantee the pseudonymity and therefore can-
not guarantee the unlinkability of SSO identities, because the identities are SP-
specific; some SPs may require users to log in using their e-mail addresses (as
is the case with ‘anonymous’ FTP sites and some web sites), public key certifi-
cates, or their social security numbers. True SSO systems, on the other hand, can
be designed such that SSO identities do not contain any personally identifying
information and remain unlinkable even if SPs collude.
Of course, the success of privacy protection assumes that unlinkable means of
payment exist (where users need to pay for services). Whilst many such schemes
have been proposed, they have yet to make a major impact in the commercial
environment.
3.2 Anonymous network access
Whether or not otherwise unlinkable SSO identities remain secure when an at-
tacker has access to network address information depends on the wider context
within which the SSO scheme is deployed. If, for example, the lower layer pro-
tocols do not provide anonymous network access, an attacker can easily com-
promise unlinkability by correlating SSO identities using information found in
packet headers or traffic analysis [1]. Unfortunately, the user’s network address
(which is typically included in packet headers) also reveals the identity and ge-
ographical location of his/her network access provider. The provider can then
help link the network address (and thereby SSO identities) back to the user’s
real identity.
These privacy issues are addressed by schemes that provide anonymous net-
work access. Such schemes are typically implemented through an externally op-
erated ‘anonymising proxy’. All traffic between the user and the SPs is physi-
cally routed through that proxy, which replaces the user’s real network address
(and perhaps other identifying information) with its own. The achieved level of
anonymity depends, of course, on the number of users in the system [19]. Ex-
amples of such anonymity services are the Anonymizer (www.anonymizer.com)
and Freedom WebSecure3 from zerøknowledge.
Such single-proxy schemes do not protect against traffic analysis, and all
trust resides within the proxy operator. There exist more powerful schemes, such
as those described in [4, 7], that do protect against traffic analysis and ideally
distribute the trust amongst disparate security domains. An example of such a
system is JAP (anon.inf.tu-dresden.de).
Anonymising services can be employed in conjunction with SSO systems in
order to increase the level of SSO identity unlinkability. In fact, SSO-proxies
could be augmented with the functionality of an anonymising proxy. Of course
all traffic would have to be physically routed through the proxy, but the user
would not have to trust an additional entity. In the case of proxy-based pseudo-
SSO, the architecture might be completely transparent to SPs: they would not
even need to be aware of the proxy’s existence.
3 www.freedom.net/products/websecure
73.3 User mobility
Proxy-based SSO architectures inherently support user mobility; users can au-
thenticate themselves to the ASP/pseudo-SSO component from anywhere in the
network (except, of course, if the authentication method itself imposes restric-
tions on this). We thus concentrate on how user mobility can be supported in
local SSO schemes.
In local pseudo-SSO systems, user mobility can be supported if the creden-
tial database is held on an external server: initial authentication between user
and server occurs once at the beginning of a session and credentials are then
downloaded to the local machine as needed. The degree of trust in the server
varies according to whether or not credentials are stored in an encrypted form.
Novell’s SecureLogin4, Passlogix’ V-GO (www.passlogix.com/sso) and Proto-
com’s SecureLogin (www.protocom.cc) products are examples of local pseudo-
SSO systems with support for user mobility. One can also regard automatic
form-fillers as products with pseudo-SSO functionality. Examples include the
automatic form completion functions of popular web browsers and Novell’s Dig-
italMe (www.digitalme.com) service.
However, the local true SSO scheme described in [18] does not support cross-
platform user mobility per se, as SSO identities are bound to the user platform
itself (see section 4.5).
3.4 Use in an untrusted environment
Some scenarios require users to access SPs from untrusted or hostile environ-
ments, such as Internet cafe´s or public terminals. In this situation it is undesir-
able if the untrusted machine ever has access to authentication credentials that
will allow it to later launch successful impersonation attacks.
In such scenarios proxy-based SSO schemes might prove useful. Of course,
the initial authentication between user and proxy must have the property that
observation of one authentication exchange does not enable subsequent imper-
sonation of the user, as in, for example, a one-time password scheme or a suitable
challenge/response protocol (see, for example, [16]). Building on this, and assum-
ing that all network traffic between the user and the SPs is physically routed
through it, the proxy may also provide an additional privacy protection service
by ‘stripping off’ all personal data before it reaches the untrusted machine.
3.5 Deployment and maintenance costs
Generally speaking, it is far less costly to deploy pseudo-SSO schemes, because
they do not require any common security infrastructure; moreover, existing SPs
may not need to change at all. On the other hand, if any SP does change its
user authentication mechanisms after deployment, this has to be reflected in
the pseudo-SSO component. This increases the maintenance costs, especially in
dynamically changing environments.
4 www.novell.com/products/securelogin
8The situation is reversed in true SSO-schemes. Deployment of true SSO sys-
tems requires a costly, system-wide security framework (such as a Public Key
Infrastructure) to support SP-ASP secure communications, which might involve
service level and liability transfer agreements. Once the infrastructure is in place,
however, maintenance costs are likely to be small, since changes in the authen-
tication interface occur only between the user and his/her chosen ASP(s).
3.6 Running costs
The running costs of local SSO schemes are likely to be lower than those of proxy-
based systems. This is because local SSO schemes do not require the continuous
online presence of a server.
Proxy-based systems depend, of course, on the security and availability of the
external proxy server. The server constitutes a single point of failure in the sys-
tem, and must be protected against service denial attacks. Moreover additional
communications costs might be incurred if all traffic is physically routed through
the proxy. Further, in proxy-based true SSO systems, SPs may be charged by
the ASP for the authentication service.
3.7 Trust relationships
As explained in section 2.4, under both pseudo and true SSO, users and SPs
need to trust the Pseudo-SSO component/ASP for the purposes of SSO. A local
SSO system, such as the one described in [18], has the advantage that the user
does not have to trust an externally operated entity, although the user will still
need to trust the integrity of the software providing the SSO functionality.
It is important to note that, despite the universal need for user trust in the
SSO component, there remain differences in the nature of the trust relationships
involved in true and pseudo-SSO schemes. In the case of a true SSO scheme,
the common security infrastructure allows for the trust relationships between
the SPs and ASPs to be precisely described and regulated by policies, service
level and liability transfer agreements, and other means outside the scope of SSO
in the technical sense. Furthermore, if the user’s authentication credentials are
compromised, SSO can be disabled centrally.
Under pseudo-SSO the trust relationships are more diffuse. SPs may not even
be aware that a SSO scheme is in place. Credential databases may be encrypted
and replicated at several servers. The trust relationship between the user, any
servers and the pseudo-SSO component depends on the implementation details
of the scheme. The trust relationship between pseudo-SSO component and SPs
may be different for each SP, and may change whenever individual SPs modify
their authentication interfaces.
3.8 Conflict resolution and lawful access
In the event of a dispute or lawful investigation, the operator of the proxy in a
proxy-based (true or pseudo) SSO scheme may provide evidence of events, as a
9trusted third party, by keeping logs of authentications. The situation is likely to
be better defined in a true SSO system, as in such systems there is necessarily a
well-defined relationship between ASPs and SPs.
Local SSO schemes are much less likely to be useful in this sense, since
evidence can either be deleted, e.g. if it might be embarrassing to the user, or
modified. However, if the ASP in a local true SSO system incorporates physical
protection measures, which enables it to be trusted by third parties (see, for
example, [18]), then locally stored event logs may still possess evidential value.
3.9 Open versus closed environments
The issue of privacy protection (which includes anonymous network access and
use in untrusted environments) is usually deemed to be of less importance in
closed environments. Thus, the main focus for SSO for closed systems is likely
to be the deployment, running and maintenance costs. Since these are less for
pseudo-SSO systems, especially in relatively stable environments, ‘enterprise’
pseudo-SSO solutions promise a rapid and concrete return on investment. Ar-
chitectures of such systems are examined in [6], and examples of real-world imple-
mentations include Computer Associates’ eTrust Single Sign-On5 and Evidian’s
AccessMaster (www.evidian.com/accessmaster).
However, the need for privacy protection in open environments may well
outweigh the deployment cost of true SSO schemes. Thus it seems likely that
true SSO systems will eventually be required in open environments such as the
Internet. Some well-known proxy-based true SSO systems designed for open
environments are discussed in the next section.
4 Some examples of SSO schemes
This section provides more detailed descriptions of certain SSO schemes. First
note that the preponderance of existing discussed and deployed SSO schemes fall
into two of the four categories discussed above, namely local pseudo-SSO and
proxy-based true SSO schemes (examples of the former class have already been
mentioned in section 3.3). Because of this, in this section we first discuss three
important examples of the latter class. However, to show that other possibilities
exist, we also briefly discuss two further examples, namely of a proxy-based
pseudo-SSO scheme and a local true SSO scheme.
4.1 Kerberos
Although Kerberos is formally described as a ‘network authentication system’ [8,
22], one can regard it as a SSO scheme. A single security domain, or realm,
consists of a set of users, an Authentication Server, a ‘Ticket Granting Server’
and a set of relying SPs. The Authentication Server and Ticket Granting Server
5 www3.ca.com/Solutions/Product.asp?ID=166
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can be combined into a single entity called the ‘Kerberos server’ which acts
as the ASP. The security infrastructure of Kerberos relies solely on symmetric
cryptography; every user and SP shares a long-term secret key with the ASP.
A simplified description of SSO under Kerberos follows. The protocol is ex-
ecuted whenever the uses wishes to log into an SP of the realm.
1. If the user already possesses a valid ‘Ticket Granting Ticket’ (TGT) from
a previous protocol run, this step is skipped. Otherwise, the user requests
a fresh TGT from the ASP. The ASP replies with a message that contains
a fresh TGT, and a ‘session key’ which will be used to construct an ‘au-
thenticator’, i.e. a data structure which is encrypted under a session key
and contains elements that protect against replay attacks. This session key
is encrypted under the long-term key the user shares with the ASP (or a
key derived from it). The user decrypts the session key by supplying his/her
long-term key.
2. The user sends a message to the ASP that contains the TGT, an authentica-
tor (encrypted under the aforementioned session key), and the identifier of
the SP he/she wishes to access. The ASP checks the validity of the received
message. If not satisfied, (if, for example, the TGT has expired) authentica-
tion fails. Otherwise the user is now deemed authenticated at the ASP.
3. The ASP replies with a message that contains a ‘Service Granting Ticket’
(SGT) a data structure encrypted under the key shared by the ASP and
the SP in question, and a second session key which is encrypted under the
session key of step 1.
4. The user now constructs a message containing the SGT and an authenti-
cator encrypted under the second session key. This message, if constructed
correctly, demonstrates the user’s ability to decrypt the second session key
and can be regarded as an authentication assertion. The user sends it to the
SP which decrypts it and, if valid, logs the user in.
The tickets (TGT and SGT) are encrypted data structures that contain
(among other things) the user identifier and network address, the server identi-
fier, corresponding session keys and expiration timestamps. SSO is achieved by
the fact that the user does not need to reenter his/her long-term key as long as
the TGT remains valid.
SSO among multiple realms is achieved by setting up the required relation-
ships and symmetric keys between the involved Kerberos servers. There is no
restriction as to the type (web, FTP, etc.) of SPs that may rely on Kerberos for
user authentication as long as they follow the protocol.
Since the same user identifier is used with every SP, the SSO identity/SP
relationship under Kerberos is 1 : n. Thus, unlinkability of SSO identities is not
an issue. It is interesting to observe that even distinct Kerberos accounts of a
given user are still linkable as tickets bind them to the user’s network address.
Since the authentication mechanism is based on a long-term secret key, user
mobility can be supported (if the key is derived from a password, for example)
but it is not suitable for use in an untrusted environment.
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4.2 The Liberty Alliance
The Liberty Alliance (www.projectliberty.org), a consortium of over 140
member companies, recently developed a set of open specifications for web-
based SSO. In Liberty terminology [12], the ASP and the user are the ‘Iden-
tity Provider’ and ‘Principal’ respectively. The specifications use the Security
Assertions Markup Language (SAML), a platform-independent framework for
exchanging authentication and authorisation information6. Liberty is based on
the notion of ‘trust circles’ which are formed by trusted ASPs and sets of relying
SPs. The relationship between ASP and SPs has to be supported by contractual
agreements outside the scope of the specifications.
According to the specifications, users first authenticate themselves to the
ASP, which subsequently conveys authentication assertions to the relying SPs in
order to facilitate SSO. The assertions contain ‘name identifiers’ that allow SPs
to differentiate between users. For any given user, the ASP has to use a distinct
identifier with each SP of the trust circle. Thus, under Liberty, the SSO iden-
tity/SP relationship is 1 : 1. Furthermore, name identifiers “must be constructed
using pseudo-random values that have no discernible correspondence with the
Principals identifier (e.g. username) at the Identity Provider [ASP]” [15, p.12];
SSO identities are pseudonymous and, by themselves, unlinkable. Unlinkability,
however, can be compromised, as SPs may be able to correlate SSO identities
based on the users’ network addresses. Use of an anonymous network access
scheme (section 3.2) could help with this. Profile information that individual
SPs may maintain (such as shopping habits, telephone numbers or credit card
details) can also compromise unlinkability. For the time being, “the only pro-
tection is for Principals to be cautious when they choose service providers and
understand their privacy policies” [14, p.70]. An independent assessment of the
specifications with respect to privacy appears in [20].
The Liberty specifications are authentication method neutral; the details
of the particular method employed are explicitly stated in the authentication
assertions [13]. This means that, under a suitable user authentication mechanism,
user mobility or even use in an untrusted environment can be supported.
The Liberty Protocols and Schema Specification [15] defines generic require-
ments for the protocols for conveying assertion requests and responses between
parties. Concrete protocol bindings are only specified in the context of a Liberty
profile. All currently specified profiles rely on the Secure Socket Layer (SSL)
or the Transport Layer Security (TLS) [21] protocol in order to provide secure
channels between parties. Hence, a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) must be in
place. A separate PKI may be required if a profile is used that requires assertions
to be digitally signed. Authentication assertions sent from the ASP to the SP
are routed through the user browser via web redirects; in the ‘browser/POST’
profile, for example, assertions are sent within an HTTP form while in the
‘browser/artifact’ profile an ‘artifact’ is encoded in the URL that the SP can
later resolve into an assertion [14].
6 www.oasis-open.org/committees/security
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According to [10], the next version of Liberty will include a framework for
permissions-based attribute sharing which will allow organisations of a given
trust circle to be linked together, as opposed to operating independently. Thus,
the specifications are targeted towards a more comprehensive treatment of Iden-
tity Management that extends beyond the provision of SSO.
4.3 Microsoft Passport
Microsoft Passport (www.passport.com) is a web-based SSO service offered by
Microsoft since 1999. The passport server acts as the ASP. Users register with
the ASP by supplying a valid e-mail address and a password (or, if they register
from a mobile phone, their phone number and a Personal Identification Number).
Additional profile information, such as address, date of birth and credit card de-
tails, may also be stored in their passport accounts. Every account is uniquely
identified by a 64-bit number called the ‘Passport User ID’ (PUID). SPs that
wish to offer SSO for registered passport users need to sign a contractual agree-
ment with Microsoft (which involves a yearly provisioning fee of $10,000 [17]),
implement a special component in their web server software, and share a secret
key with the ASP. Since SSL/TLS channels are required between the user and
the passport server (and optionally between user and SP), an appropriate PKI
must also be in place.
SSO is achieved by the following protocol, which is executed whenever the
user wishes to log into an SP.
1. The user’s browser is redirected to the ASP.
2. The ASP tries to retrieve a ‘Ticket Granting Cookie’ (TGC) from the web
browser’s cookie cache. If one is found, if it decrypts successfully, and if it is
valid, the user is deemed authenticated and the rest of this step is skipped.
Otherwise, the ASP requests the user to authenticate him/herself. Assuming
successful authentication, the ASP saves a fresh TGC in the browser’s cookie
cache. This cookie is encrypted under a ‘master key’ only known to the
ASP. Its function is similar to the TGT of Kerberos; there is, however, no
‘authenticator’ in Passport — replaying a stolen TGC results in successful
impersonation.
3. The ASP saves a set of cookies in the browser’s cookie cache which includes
the user’s PUID and other profile information the user has consented to
share at registration time. This cookie set is encrypted under the secret key
shared between the ASP and the SP in question. Its functionality is similar
to Kerberos’ SGT and acts as an authentication assertion.
4. The user’s browser is redirected back to the desired SP which reads and
decrypts the aforementioned cookie set and, if satisfied, logs in the user.
SSO is achieved by the fact that, as long as the TGC remains valid, the user
does not need to re-authenticate (in step 1) in subsequent protocol runs. As the
authentication method is password-based, user mobility is supported, but it is
not suitable for use in an untrusted environment. Passport, like Kerberos, uses a
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single SSO identity (the PUID) with every SP. The SSO identity/SP relationship
is therefore 1 : n and unlinkability is not an issue.
According to [11], in the future Passport will be based on Kerberos.
4.4 An outline of a proxy-based pseudo-SSO scheme
One alternative to the true SSO schemes described above would involve a proxy
acting as a gateway to service providers. The user would first authenticate to
the proxy, e.g. using a one-time password scheme. The user would connect to
SPs via the proxy, which would transparently ‘fill in’ identifiers and passwords
for specific SPs, using information from its credential database.
Such an approach would have several major advantages. It would enable
access to services from an untrusted PC since SP-specific credentials would not
reach the user PC (see section 3.3). Like other pseudo-SSO schemes it could
be deployed transparently, i.e. without requiring individual SPs to make any
changes to their authentication procedures. Moreover user mobility is supported.
However, like other pseudo-SSO schemes, unlinkability of SSO identities cannot
be guaranteed.
4.5 A local true SSO scheme built upon TCPA
The final example scheme we consider is described in much greater detail in
[18]. The Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA) is an industry consor-
tium established to agree specifications for ways in which to include a trusted
component within a computing platform. The scheme shows how to use a TCPA-
compliant platform to establish a local true SSO system.
In this scheme a component within the user’s platform, which we call the
Authentication Service (AS), acts as the ASP; it authenticates the user and
subsequently conveys assertions to SPs whenever necessary. The integrity of the
user platform’s software state (which includes the AS) is measured by a TCPA
function called ‘Integrity Metrics’. Any given SP reliably acquires these soft-
ware metrics through an ‘Integrity Challenge/Response’ session, also specified
by TCPA. This step requires a PKI to be in place. The SP then needs to verify
that the given metrics represent a software configuration that is trusted for the
purposes of SSO. This step includes verification of certificates supplied by the
manufacturer(s) of software (including the AS) running on the user’s platform.
The scheme uses TCPA-specified credentials, called ‘Identity Credentials’, as
SSO identities. An Identity Credential is a certificate issued by a special authority
and certifies that the specified platform conforms to the TCPA specifications
(without, however, uniquely identifying the particular platform). Any given user
can acquire an arbitrary number of such credentials for his/her platform. As
these Identity Credentials act as SSO identities, SPs also need to verify them —
a function which requires another PKI to be in place.
The scheme offers a n : m relationship between SSO identities and SPs,
allowing the assignment of roles to SSO identities. User mobility, however, is not
supported per se, as SSO identities are bound to the user’s platform.
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5 Conclusions
We have presented an abstract taxonomy of SSO systems and have analysed the
properties of the identified four main types of SSO scheme. The characteristics
of these four types of scheme are summarised in Table 1. We have also presented
some examples of SSO schemes in the light of the taxonomy. Unfortunately,
(with the exception of the recently proposed scheme described in section 4.5)
none of the true SSO schemes offers a n : m SSO identity/SP relationship and
therefore cannot be used to assign roles to SSO identities; a separate account has
to be created at the ASP for every role. This is clearly a topic meriting further
study.
Table 1. Properties of SSO systems.
Local pseudo-
SSO
Proxy-based
pseudo-SSO
Local true-
SSO
Proxy-based
true SSO
Pseudonymity
and Unlinkabil-
ity
cannot be
guaranteed
cannot be
guaranteed
can be guar-
anteed
can be guar-
anteed
Anonymous
Network Access
needs addi-
tional services
can be inte-
grated
needs addi-
tional services
can be inte-
grated
Support for
User Mobility
needs addi-
tional services
under suitable
authentica-
tion method
needs addi-
tional services
under suitable
authentica-
tion method
Use in Un-
trusted Environ-
ment
not supported under suitable
authentica-
tion method
not supported under suitable
authentica-
tion method
Deployment
Costs
low low high high
Maintenance
Costs
potentially
high
potentially
high
low low
Running Costs low high low high
Trust Relation-
ships
dynamically
changing
dynamically
changing
concrete and
consistent
concrete and
consistent
It is clear that each SSO architecture has its strengths and weaknesses, and
one must carefully consider the environment before opting for a particular SSO
solution. Generally speaking, pseudo-SSO schemes are probably more suitable
for closed systems, where privacy protection is less of an issue. Identity Man-
agement in that context just refers to the management of the life cycle of the
credentials the user maintains within the closed system. On the other hand,
Identity Management in open environments like the Internet, may well need to
incorporate privacy protection. SSO schemes, privacy protection services (such
as the ones discussed in sections 3.2 and 3.4) and privacy-aware Identity Man-
agement schemes, such as the ones described in [2, 5, 9], could be integrated into
a true SSO scheme. Indeed, it would appear that a precise indication of the
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achieved privacy level is possible only with the combined use of a suitable true
SSO scheme. A practical scheme that could deliver such an indication would
potentially be useful. Moreover, it would be interesting to see how anonymous
credential systems, such as the one described in [3], could be combined with
authentication method-neutral SSO (possibly along with anonymous network
access).
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